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Abstract
This paper considers an equilibrium labour market with on-the-job search
where heterogeneous rms, both by productivity and size, post wages and
choose optimal hiring strategies. There are aggregate and rm specic pro-
ductivity shocks. Industry dynamics are rich. By comparing the market out-
come to the competitive allocation, simple numerical examples establishes
how dynamic monopsony generates excessive job-to-job turnover, excessive
job destruction rates at low productivity rms and so generates "too high"
unemployment. It explains why gross hire ows and gross separation ows
may be large and volatile, yet yield an unemployment process which is highly
persistent.
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1 Introduction
Menzio and Shi (2011) demonstrate for the U.S. that job-to-job transitions
are large, volatile and markedly procyclical. Fallick and Fleishman (2004)
further report for the U.S. that around 40% of new hires are lled by job-
to-job transitions. In this paper we illustrate using numerical examples why
such turnover not only has a major impact on the unemployment dynamics
of the economy, it has important consequences for government policy.
A central issue within the dynamic monopsony framework is whether rms
can wage discriminate between identical workers. Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) presumes not: that equal pay legislation requires rms must pay the
same wage to equally productive workers doing the same job (regardless of
race, gender etc). In contrast the sequential auction approach of Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002) allows perfect wage discrimination which then allows rms
to fully respond to outside o¤ers. Here we use dynamic monopsony to refer to
the no wage discrimination case. In this case wage setting (monopsonistic)
rms face a trade-o¤ between paying low company wages and low worker
retention rates. Should a worker receive a preferred outside o¤er, the worker
simply quits and the rm chooses recruitment e¤ort to hire replacement
employees who are always hired at the company wage.
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) and Coles and Mortensen (2015) [CM
from now on] extend the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework to costly
rm hiring and stochastic shocks. CM in addition allows rich industry dy-
namics, where new start-up companies enter the market over time while older
(less productive rms) exit the market and there are rm specic productivity
shocks. In these frameworks, a macro-model of equilibrium unemployment
is obtained by simply integrating over the (endogenously evolving) rm size
distribution.
Using the CM framework we compare the dynamic monopsony equilib-
rium to the competitive allocation and show why dynamic monopsony gener-
ates too high unemployment. The reason is not because rm hiring rates are
too low. Rather dynamic monopsony generates excessive quit rates where a
job-to-job transition implies a job is destroyed at the previous employer (and
replacing a worker who quits is a costly, time consuming process). In contrast
the (steady state) competitive allocation corresponds to a single Walrasian
wage and there is no wasteful worker turnover.
We illustrate with numerical examples the four key insights of this ap-
proach:
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 it is more e¢ cient that a rm hires from the unemployment pool than
poach an employed worker who has already been recruited at some cost.
The competitive (steady state) equilibrium nds the Auctioneer an-
nounces a single wage (the shadow price of an unemployed worker) and
there are no job-to-job transitions. Instead equilibrium wage disper-
sion with dynamic monopsony induces wasteful job turnover as already
employed workers on low wages seek better paid employment;
 by generating excessive job-to-job quit rates, dynamic monopsony causes
too high job destruction rates at low productivity rms. A numerical
example establishes why unemployment is signicantly higher than in
the competitive outcome;
 as aggregate hiring rates increase in an economic recovery, job-to-
job quits also increase. This not only crowds out the re-employment
prospects of the unemployed, excessive job destruction rates at low pro-
ductivity rms implies unemployment is slow to fall. As job-to-job ows
automatically track hire ows, unemployment remains persistently high
in an economic recovery;
 the equilibrium distribution of wages paid di¤ers from that of the com-
petitive allocation and so distorts the distribution of employment across
heterogeneous rms.
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) was the rst to consider stochastic
equilibria with dynamic monopsony and undirected search. For the most
part, it considers exogenous contact rates and establishes the existence of
rank preserving equilibria. When hiring is instead costly and endogenously
chosen, the framework is much more complex for the distribution of employ-
ment across rms, G; is a relevant state variable (it determines the distribu-
tion of worker quit rates) is innitely dimensional and evolves endogenously
depending on rm recruitment choices. Dealing with this state space issue is
a major problem. There are currently three successful theoretical approaches.
Menzio and Shi (2011) attack this issue in a directed on-the-job search
framework. One key assumption is that it assumes rms commit to pay
marginal product and post job fees which potential employees must pay on
being hired (see Stevens (2004)). As employees are always paid marginal
product, their quit decisions are then jointly e¢ cient. Directed on-the-job
search by employed workers also ensures that job-to-job transitions do not
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crowd out the re-employment prospects of the unemployed. By also making
a standard free entry of vacancies assumption, Menzio and Shi (2011) then
show the equilibrium rm and worker values are independent of G : so-
called block recursivity. This strong result makes numerical computation of
market equilibrium remarkably straightforward. As the market is constrained
e¢ cient, however, there is no interesting role for labor market policy.
Lise and Robin (2015) instead adopt the sequential auction approach
introduced by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), augmented with a competi-
tive vacancy market. Like Menzio and Shi (2011), quits are jointly e¢ cient
though for a di¤erent reason: rms Bertrand compete on values paid should
an employee receive an outside o¤er. Also like Menzio and Shi (2011), com-
petitive vacancy creation yields the strong result that the equilibrium surplus
to a match can be computed independently of G. With two sided heterogene-
ity and a one-rm/one job technology assumption, it identies a most ele-
gant framework for understanding how mismatch, in a frictional assignment
framework, evolves over the cycle.
As job fees are ruled out by assumption and rms cannot wage discrim-
inate, quits in CM are not jointly e¢ cient and equilibrium does not have
the "block recursive" property. Equilibrium is instead a complex xed point
problem where rm wage and hiring strategies must be a best response to the
market collective and in a stochastic environment. CM identies a tractable
framework by assuming hiring costs exhibit constant returns to scale - that
should a larger rm with twice as many employees wish to hire twice as
many new hires, then its hiring costs are simply double. CM then shows in
a Markov perfect (Bayesian) equilibrium that the (nite) vector N; where
Ni describes total employment in rms in state i; is a su¢ cient statistic for
the innitely dimensional rm size distribution function G. Equilibrium can
then be directly computed using value function iteration. Here we illustrate
the underlying principles using simple numerical examples.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2-4 quickly describe the CM
framework and equilibrium. Section 5 restricts attention to steady state
and compares the equilibrium properties of dynamic monopsony to the com-
petitive allocation. Section 6 considers non-steady state dynamics and, by
computing the impulse response function, identies how the economy adjusts
to a favourable (permanent ) aggregate productivity shock.
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2 The CM Model.
Time is continuous, denoted t 2 [0;1). There is a unit measure of agents
who are risk neutral, equally productive, innitely lived and discount the
future at rate r > 0. Each agent is either (i) employed earning some wage w,
(ii) unemployed with home productivity b  0 or (iii) an entrepreneur trying
to start-up a new company.
Each rm is risk neutral with productivity p = p(x; ) where x 2 [0; 1] is
a rm specic productivity parameter and  2 [; ] an aggregate parameter.
There are constant returns to scale: a rm with (integer) n employees gen-
erates ow revenue np(x; ). p(:) is increasing in both arguments, where the
lowest productivity state p = p(0; ) > b and p = p(1; ) denotes maximal
productivity. For the moment assume p(:) is strictly increasing in x but we
relax this assumption for the case of nite rm productivity states.
There is rm turnover: new rms are created at an exogenous rate  > 0
while existing rms die at rate (x; )  0 where (:) is decreasing in x (i.e.
more productive rms have greater survival rates). At start-up, a rms
initial productivity x is a random draw from c.d.f.  0(:): Conditional on
survival, each rm x receives a rm specic productivity shock at rate   0;
whereupon its new productivity x0 2 [0; 1] is considered a random draw from
c.d.f.  1(:jx): Throughout we assume rst order stochastic dominance in  1
and  1(0j0) = 1 which implies the lowest productivity state is absorbing.
Firm productivity x is private information to the rm.
 evolves stochastically according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
  0 and new productivity draw 0 2 [; ] considered a random draw from
c.d.f. H(0j):We assume the aggregate productivity parameter  is common
knowledge.
Firms post wages, cannot precommit to future wages and equal treatment
(no discrimination) requires a rm must pay equally productive employees
the same wage. As productivity x is private information, a rms posted
wage w signals x. Should an employee receive an outside job o¤er at wage
w
0
; the worker uses these wage signals to predict future wages at the two
rms and takes employment at the rm which is perceived to o¤er greater
expected value. Once a worker rejects a job, there is no recall.
If a rm with n employees recruits new employees at rate H; its foregone
revenues due to the costly recruitment process is p(x; )C(H;n).1 Assuming
1Recent empirical work suggests that "adjustment costs" of this form explain the data
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constant returns in C(:); hiring costs are equivalent to np(x; )c(h); where
h = H=n is the rms hire rate per employee, c(h)  C(h; 1) and c(:) is
assumed continuously di¤erentiable, strictly convex with c(0) = c0(0) = 0.
We abstract from job search e¤ort: all agents receive job o¤ers at the same
rate (:) and, with random contacts, we let F (:) denote the distribution of
the value of job o¤ers made by rms. Both of these objects are endogenously
determined and evolve stochastically.
Let 1 Gt(x) denote the measure of workers employed at rms with pro-
ductivity parameter no less than x 2 [0; 1] at date t: Hence Ut = Gt(0) is the
number who are not employed and Gt(1) = 1: Agents who are not employed
choose either to be home producers (with ow output b) or entrepreneurs.
Let Et  Ut denote the measure of non-employed agents who choose to be
entrepreneurs. There is perfect crowding out: each entrepreneur successfully
starts up a new rm at rate =Et. Should an entrepreneur successfully create
a new start-up, he/she sells the start-up company for its value and becomes
the rms rst employee. In this way, each start-up begins life with n = 1
and x   0: Throughout we assume =b su¢ cently small that some unem-
ployed workers always choose to be home producers and so Et < Ut. This
simplies as it ensures no employed worker wishes to quit into unemployment
to become an entrepreneur:
3 Markov Perfect (Bayesian) Equilibria.
As CM fully characterise equilibrium, here we only sketch the relevant argu-
ment. We restrict attention to separating Markov perfect (Bayesian) equi-
libria [MPBE from now on] in which the optimal wage strategies of rms are
continuous and strictly increasing in x: This is a natural case for, as in a rst
price auction, more productive rms (buyers) bid strictly higher wages and
workers sell their services to the buyer who posts the highest price. Indeed
the information structure and random contacts assumption yields a rst price
auction structure with private independent values. It is thus highly tractable.
Each rm in anMPBE is described by (x; n; ;G): Let(x; n; ;G) denote
its expected discounted prot. As there are constant returns to scale, the
optimal wage strategies w = w(x; ;G) are independent of rm size. Below
better than the more traditional "recruiting cost" specication. For example, see Sala et
al. (2012) and Christiano et al (2012).
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we establish the empirically well-known large rm wage e¤ect, that wages
are positively correlated with (though here not caused by) rm size.
As equilibriumw(:) is strictly increasing in x; the rms wage o¤er fully re-
veals its productivity x: Thus given any announced wagew0 2 [w(0; :); w(1; :)];
Bayes rule implies each employee infers its employer has productivity x = bx 2
[0; 1] solving w(bx; ;G) = w0: If a rm posts a "too low" wage w0 < w(0; :),
there is no rm state which corresponds to this posted wage. Existence of
an equilibrium requires belief bx(w0; :) = 0. If instead the rm posts wage
w0 > w(1; :), we set belief bx(w0; :) = 1. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs in this
latter case play no important role.
As equilibriumwages paid do not depend on rm size, we can letW (x; ;G)
denote a workers equilibrium lifetime discounted utility when employed at
rm (x; n; ;G). Employees, of course, do not observe x: Given any posted
wage w0; each employee rst updates productivity belief bx(w0; :) as dened
above and then infers corresponding value of employment W 0 = W (bx; ;G):
We let Vu(;G) denote the value of being non-employed which, with free entry
into entrepreneurship, must also describe the value of being an entrepreneur.
CM formally establish the following Claim.
Claim 1. Optimal worker search:
(i) Unemployed workers use a reservation wage strategy R = b; i.e. they
accept any job which o¤ers wage w  b and prefer being unemployed other-
wise;
(ii) Employed workers on wage w  b quit to an outside o¤er if and only
if it o¤ers a higher wage w0 > w:
Workers always quit to a higher outside wage o¤er as they infer the out-
side rm has higher productivity and, as wages are increasing in productivity,
anticipate higher wages at that rm in the entire future. Workers have reser-
vation wage b as the unemployed and employed have equal access to the
same job search technology (e.g. Lise (2013)). Of course with endogenous
job search e¤ort, unemployed workers would choose greater search e¤ort (as
their return to search is larger) and receive job o¤ers at a faster rate. The
extension to endogenous search e¤ort, however, is beyond the scope of this
paper.2 Given such search strategies, we now determine the equilibrium wage
and hiring strategies of rms.
2CM also show that Claim 1 requires state x = 0 must also be absorbing. Otherwise
there is a positive probability of a favourable productivity shock and the option value of
remaining employed would imply R < b:
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4 Equilibrium Firm Behaviour.
Firm (x; n; ;G) chooses wage w0 and recruitment rate h0 to solve the recur-
sive Bellman equation:
[r+(x; )](x; n; :) = max
w0;h00
* n[p(x; )  w0]  np(x; )c(h0)+nh0 [(x; n+ 1; :)  (x; n; :)]
+nq(bx; :) [(x; n  1; :)  (x; n; :)]
+
R 1
0
[(x0; n; :)  (x; n; :)] d 1(x0jx)
+
R 

[(x; n; 0; :)  (x; n; ; :)] dH(0j) + @
@t
+
:
The rst line describes ow prot, the second is the capital gain by success-
fully recruiting a new employee, the third is the prot loss though a quit
(where the quit rate q(bx; ;G) depends on the induced belief bx = bx(w0; :));
the fourth the gain through a state-x productivity shock, the last the gain
through a state- productivity shock. The last term captures the e¤ect on
(:) through the stochastic evolution of G.
The constant returns structure implies (x; n; ;G) = nv(x; ;G) where
v(x; ;G) is the prot per employee in rm (x; n; ;G): The Bellman equation
above reduces to the following Bellman equation for v(:) :
(r+ (:)++)v(x; :) = max
w0;h00
* p(x; ) + [h0v(x; :)  p(x; )c(h0)]  [w0 + q(bx(w0; :); :)v(x; :)]
+
R 1
0
v(x0; :)d 1(x0jx)
+
R 

[v(x; 0; :)]dH(0j) + @v
@t
+
: (1)
(1) implies the rms optimal hire strategy h = h(x; ;G) satises
c0(h) =
v(x; ;G)
p(x; )
; (2)
and so is independent of rm size. Note this yields a form of Gibrats law:
conditional on survival, the net growth rate of rm (x; n; ;G) is [h(x; ;G) 
q(x; ;G)] which depends on the rms state (x; ;G) but is otherwise inde-
pendent of rm size n:
We next compute the worker quit function q(:): As o¤ers are random and
workers only quit from lower productivity rms, each equilibrium job o¤er
by rm x; which o¤ers wage w = w(x; :); is only accepted with probability
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G(x). Hence to hire at equilibrium rate H = nh(x; ;G); the rm must make
job o¤ers at rate nh(x; ;G)=G(x): Aggregating across rms, noting there is
a unit measure of workers, implies each worker receives a job o¤er at rate
(;G) =
Z 1
0
h(x; ;G)
G(x)
dG(x); (3)
where dG(x) describes the measure of workers employed at type x rms. The
same aggregation argument implies equilibrium quit function
q(x; ;G) =
Z 1
x
h(z; ;G)
G(z)
dG(z); (4)
as employed workers at rm (believed to be in state) x only quit to more
productive rms x0 > x (which o¤er higher wages). If G is di¤erentiable, the
rms marginal quit rate is thus:
@q
@x
=  h(x; ;G)G
0(x)
G(x)
: (5)
The Bellman equation (1) implies the rms wage strategy minimizes the
sum of the wage bill and turnover costs; i.e.
w(x; :) = argmin
w0
[w0 + q(bx; ;G)]v(x; :)] : (6)
CM establish the following wage equation.
Claim 2: Equilibrium wage equation.
If G is di¤erentiable, equilibrium w(:) is the solution to the initial value
problem:
@w
@x
=
h(x; :)G0(x)
G(x)
v(x; :) for all x 2 [0; 1] (7)
with w(0; :) = b:
The wage equation (7) describes the dynamic monopsony wage trade-o¤:
a marginally higher wage paid by rm x marginally reduces its employee
quit rate by h(x; :)G0(x)=G(x) with corresponding value v(x; :) should the
employee choose not to quit: This wage equation has the same structure as
that of a rst price auction with independent private values. Less productive
rms, say those in state xL < x; bid lower wage wL = w(xL; :) < w(x; :) as
they have lower employee value vL = v(xL; :): At this wage point wL, rm
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x nds the return to reducing its quit rate exceeds the prot loss by paying
higher wages; i.e.
h(xL; :)G
0(xL)
G(xL)
v(x; :) >
h(xL; :)G
0(xL)
G(xL)
vL =
@w(xL)
@x
:
It thus bids higher wage w > wL: Of course it does not raise its wage beyond
equilibrium wage w(x; :) as the reduced quit rate no longer fully compensates
for the cost of paying higher wages. Given this wage structure, an MPBE
can now be formally dened.
Denition of Equilibrium: An MPBE is the set < v; h; q; w; bx > such that
for all x 2 [0; 1] and (;G):
(Di) employee value v(x; ;G) satises (1);
(Dii) hire strategy h(x; ;G) satises (2);
(Diii) quit function
q(x; ;G) =
Z 1
x
h(z; ;G)dG(z)
G(z)
; (8)
(Div) wage strategies w(x; ;G) satisfy Claim 2, where
(Dv) beliefs bx(w0; ; G) are rational, satisfying
w(bx; ;G) = w0 when w0 2 [w(0; ; G); w(1; ; G)] ;bx = 0 when w0 < w(0; ; G);bx = 1 when w0 > w(1; ; G);
(Dvi) (;G) are Markov processes which evolve consistently with the equi-
librium hire and quit strategies.
5 Steady State MPBE and the Competitive
Allocation.
As there is no "matching function" in the above, the competitive allocation
is well-dened. To identify the social ine¢ ciency due to dynamic monopsony,
we compare in this section the steady state MPBE outcome with no shocks
( =  = 0) to the (steady state) competititve allocation.
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For ease of exposition, suppose death rate (x) = 0 >  is the same for
all rms and that  0 is uniform. Standard turnover arguments then imply
steady state employment distribution
G(x) =
0   [1  x]
0 + q(x)
: (9)
Proposition 1. In steady state and if p(:) is di¤erentiable, an MPBE implies
fv(:); q(:)g satisfy:
dv
dx
=
[1  c(h)] p0(x)
r + 0 + q   h ; (10)
dq
dx
=   h [0 + q]
[0   (1  x)] [0 + q   h(x)] ; (11)
where h = h(x) solves c0(h) = v(x)=p(x): At x = 0; (v; q) = (v0; q0) where v0
satises:
(r + 0 + q0)v0 = p(0)  b+max
h0
[h0v0   p(0)c(h0)] ; (12)
and q0 > 0 is tied down by the endpoint condition q(1) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 1. Substitute out G in (8) using (9) to get (11).
(10) follows by di¤erentiating the Bellman equation (1) with respect to x;
using the Envelope Theorem and noting w0(x) =  q0(x)v(x) by Claim 2.
Putting x = 0 in (1) and w(0) = b yields (12). This completes the proof of
Proposition 2.
The (steady state) MPBE is the solution to a pair of rst order di¤erential
equations for (v; q) along with a pair of boundary conditions for v(0) and q(1):
(10) determines v(x) which depends on employee quit rates q(:). Associated
with those values v(x) are rm hiring rates h(x) where c0(h) = v(x)=p(x):
(11) determines the equilibrium quit function q(:) given those hiring rates
h(:): Equilibrium is a xed point where each rms value v(:) depends on its
employee quit rate q(:); while quit rates depend on the values of all other
rms and their associated recruitment rates h(:):
It is easy to show the type-x rm size distribution is Pareto with average
rm size
n(x) =
0
0 + q(x)  h(x) : (13)
Note rm size is unboundedly large if h(x) = 0 + q(x): In the numerical
example below, it turns out that h(x)   0   q(x) ! 0 as x ! 1 and so a
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handful of the most productive rms become very large corporations. This
singularity makes problematic a formal existence proof. Numerical simula-
tions, however, are perfectly straightforward.
It is easy to show the conditions of Proposition 1 imply hire rates h(:)
increase in x and quits q(:) decrease. Thus (13) implies rm size is increasing,
on average, with x: We thus obtain the large rm wage e¤ect - that larger
rms, on average, pay higher wages - even though here wages do not depend
on rm size. This structure also implies workers, on average, quit from small
to large rms. In contrast to Moscarini and Postel-vinay (2013) however, it
does not imply workers only ever quit from small to large rms. Quits also
occur from large to small whenever an outside o¤er is received from a smaller
but higher growth, start-up company.
Now compare this outcome to the competitive allocation. As all workers
are identical, the Walrasian auctioneer posts a single wage ! equal to the
shadow price of an unemployed worker. As all workers are paid the same,
there is no job-to-job turnover: all hires are from the unemployment pool.
The resulting allocation is e¢ cient as all investment costs are rm specic
and are paid by rms.
Dene the participation margin xC where p(xC) = !: Low productivity
rms with x < xC are inactive. Firms with x  xC instead enjoy value vC
given by:
(r + 0)v
C(x) = p(x)  ! +max
h0

h0vC(x)  p(x)c(h0) ; (14)
where each employee is used in the recruitment process to hire additional new
employees. The solution for vC(x) determines the rms hiring rate hC(x)
which in turn yields average rmsize
nC(x) =
0
0   hC(x) ; (15)
as quit rates are zero. As [=0]dx is the steady measure of rms with rank
x0 2 [x; x+ dx]  [0; 1]; steady state employment is
NC =

0
Z 1
xC
nC(x)dx:
There are two types of competitive allocation, either
 (i) NC < 1 (positive unemployment) and ! = b, or
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 (ii) NC = 1 (full employment) and !  b:
We demonstrate the cost of dynamic monopsony using a simple numerical
example where  0 is uniform and p(:) is linear with p(x) = b + x[p   b]:
Following Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), suppose b = 0:7 and set p = 1:3 so
that the expected productivity of a new start-up is one. Using a month as the
reference unit of time, we set r = 0:04=12 and 0 = 0:025 (which then matches
the empirical exit rate of employed workers into unemployment). Setting
 = 0=5 implies average rm size 0= =5 employees (with full employment).
Merz and Yashiv (2007) estimate cubic hiring costs c(h) = c0h3: We choose
c0 so the competitive allocation corresponds to full employment at market
wage ! = 1. Table 1 compares the resulting competitive allocation to that
of the MPBE as described in Proposition 1.3
Rank x 0 0.5 0.75 0.99 1
Wage w(x) 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.82 1.00 
Quit q(x) 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.007 0
Hire h(x) 0 0.018 0.021 0.025  0.025
Firm size n(x) 0.62 1.22 1.73 3.43 1
Competitive wage ! 1 1 1 1 1
Competitive hC(x) 0 0 0.015 0.024 0.025 
Competitive nC(x) 0 1 2.51 40.1 104,700
Table 1: MPBE with a continuum of rm types.
In this example all rms in the MPBE are active, enjoy greater prot than
in the competitive allocation (they post low wages w < !) and so recruit at
a greater rate, h(x) > hC(x): The MPBE nds the bottom 75% of rms by
productivity pay wages very close to b = 0:7 !: Although the equilibrium
quit rates from these rms are high, their marginal quit rates are low and
so wages only rise slowly in this range. As x ! 1; competition between
large rms implies wages increase more quickly and a handful of the most
productive rms pay wages close to the competitive wage.
The key insight, however, is that dynamic monoposony generates high
unemployment. In this illustrative example steady state unemployment is
3les Econometrica1 solves for co in the Planners problem. Econometrica5 solves for
the MPBE, Econometrica7 computes the statistics.
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surprisingly high, being close to 50%. The reason is neither low hiring rates
nor too few active rms.4 Instead (13) and (15) reveal that high quit turnover
implies low steady state employment. This arises simply because a job-to-job
transition destroys a job at the previous employer. As replacing an employee
who quits takes time and resources, the (steady state) competitive allocation
sets wasteful job-to-job transtions to zero by ensuring all rms pay the same
competitive wage. The cost of dynamic monopsony is thus clear: equilibrium
wage dispersion generates excessive quit rates as low paid workers seek better
pay, which then generates excessive job destruction. The next section now
identies the implications of such turnover on equilibrium unemployment
dynamics.
6 Finite Firm Types and Stochastic Equilib-
rium.
In general a stochastic equilibrium is not tractable as (;G(:)) is innitely
dimensional. CM identies the following simplication. Suppose S  1
aggregate productivity states,  2 f1; 2; ::; Sg and, conditional on a shock,
let ss0 denote the transition probabilities. Suppose I  1 rm productivities.
The interval [0; 1] is partitioned into a grid (xi 1; xi]  [0; 1] with x0 = 0;
xi 1 < xi and xI = 1. Firms with rank x 2 (xi 1; xi]  [0; 1] are referred to
as state i rms, where each has the same productivity pi(); death rate i()
and transition rates ii0 between rm productivity states where i = i0 6=iii0 :
Let 0i describe the fraction of start-ups who begin as state-i rms. The wage
wi(; :) is dened as the equilibrium wage paid by rm x = xi 1 (i.e. it is the
lowest wage paid by type i rms) and qi(; :) its corresponding equilibrium
quit rate.
As each state i rm has the same production opportunities, they each
enjoy equal value vi in an MPBE. Let v =(v1; v2; :::; vI)denote the i  1
vector of rm values. Dene the generic type i hire function
hi (v; ) = argmax
h0
[h0v   pi()c(h0)] :
Hence hi (v; ) with v = vi describes the optimal hiring rate of type i rms:
4dynamic monopsony implies too many rms are active (low productivity rms survive
by paying wages below the competitive wage ! = 1) and enjoy higher values v (through
paying low wages) and so choose higher hiring rates.
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Let Ni = G(xi)   G(xi 1) denote total employment in rms of type i;
and note unemployment U = 1   iNi: CM establishes the critical result:
that the nite vector (;N) is a su¢ cient statistic for (;G(:)) in an MPBE.
Furthermore value functions vi(:) are identied by a simple set of functional
equations which can be solved using standard value function iteration. Claim
3 describes the result.
Claim 3. Over (arbitrarily small) time period  > 0; an MPBE implies
vector values v = v(;N) are the xed point to the following map:
vi(;N) = max
h0

pi()  wi + hvi(N; )  pi()c(h)
+E[vi(
0;N)j] +Pj 6=i ijvj(;N)


+e (r+i+qi++i)vi(;N); (16)
for i = 1; ::; I; where
wi = b+
i 1X
j=1
vjh

j(vj; )

ln
U +N1 + :::+Nj
U +N1 + ::+Nj 1

; (17)
qi =
IX
j=i
hj(vj; ) ln[
U +N1 + :::+Nj
U +N1 + ::+Nj 1
]; (18)
and N = N+

N(;N) with

N i = 0i + [U +N1 + :::+Ni 1]h

i ln[
U +N1 + :::+Ni
U +N1 + ::+Ni 1
] (19)
 iNi   qi+1Ni + j 6=ijiNj   j 6=iijNi
Claim 3 describes a closed set of recursive equations for vi(;N) where (17)
is found by integrating forward the wage equation (7) from x = 0, while
(18) is found by integrating backward the quit function (8) from x = 1.
Note the xed point identies the equilibrium hiring strategies of each state
i rm given the quit rates q(:) induced by the hiring strategies of all rms.
This set of Bellman equations can be solved numerically by value function
iteration. Here we report an illustrative example with three rm types, I = 3.
Although the example is not stochastic, we illustrate the impulse response of
the economy to a permanent (favourable) productivity shock.
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As in the previous example, we set r = 0:04=12 and c(:) = c0h3 with c0
chosen so that the competitive wage ! = 1 in the Planners steady state. To
generate a reasonable min-mean wage ratio (e.g. Hornstein et al (2011)), we
set b = 0:6 as then !=b ' 1:7.
The data nd large rms rarely die, rm growth rates tend to decline
with age while start-ups have relatively low survival rates (e.g. Haltiwanger
et al (2013)). To capture such rm turnover, we assume each rm i receives
a productivity shock at rate  whereupon its type falls from i to i   1: If
the lowest rm type i = 1 receives a  shock we presume its productivity
p0 = b
  and it closes down. We assume this is the only form of rm death;
i.e. only the lowest productivity rms die and do so at rate :
For purposes of illustration, pi is assumed linearly increasing in i and
entry weights 0i are linearly decreasing in i so that the distribution of start-
ups is skewed towards low productivity (i.e. most start-ups have low survival
rates). With the additional restriction that E0[pi] = 1; the 3 type case and
linearity requires p1 = 0:84; p2 = 1:08; p3 = 1:32 with corresponding entry
weights 01 = 1=2; 02 = 1=3; 03 = 1=6:
The turnover parameters (; ) are chosen so that steady state unem-
ployment equals 5% with an expected duration of unemployment equal to
3 months. This identies parameter values c0 = 1520:6;  = 0:05603 and
 = 0:0123:5
Table 2 reports the steady state MPBE for these parameter values.
type i wi hi qi Ni Average Firm size ni Mean wagei
1 0.600 0.0217 0.0872 0.292 1.35 0.649
2 0.675 0.0354 0.0454 0.381 3.53 0.767
3 0.839 0.0586 0.0190 0.277 7.70 1.045
Table 2: Steady State MPBE with Finite Firm Types.
Note the lowest productivity rms, those in states i = 1; 2 announce wages
w < w3 which are far below the competitive wage: The nal column reports
the average wage earned by type i employees and reveals that type 3 employ-
5Found by numerical6. Table 2 statistics computed in Dalecalibration1.
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ees, on average, earn more than the competitive wage.6 Dynamic monopsony
does not imply all wages paid are necessarily below the competitive wage.
To illustrate the impulse response dynamics of this economy, suppose pro-
ductivity pi() = pi and the economy starts at the steady state described
above with  = 1: Table 3 describes the adjustment dynamics of the employ-
ment distribution fNi(t)g assuming  increases permanently by 5% at date
t = 0 while home productivity b is held xed.7
time t 0 6 months 20 months new steady state
Unemployment 5.0% 4.9% 4.75% 4.5%
N1 29.2% 29.1% 29.0% 28.9%
N2 38.1% 38.1% 38.2% 38.4%
N3 27.7% 27.8% 27.9% 28.2%
Table 3. Impulse Response Function: Employment dynamics
The unemployment process is highly persistent with a half-life of 20
months. To understand why, Table 4 describes how gross hire ows and quit
ows change in response to the positive productivity shock. Column t=0 
describes those ows in the initial steady state. In this Table, [hires1]  N1h1
describes total hires (per month) by all type 1 rms while [quits1] describes
total quits by workers employed in type 1 rms.
6Using integration by parts, the average wage of workers employed in type i rms is
Mean wagei =
1
Ni
Z xi
xi 1
w(z;
)dG(z)
= wi + vihi

Gi
Ni
ln

Gi
Gi 1

  1

;
where Gi = U +jiNi: Similarly the average quit rate of workers in type i rms is
Mean quiti = qi  
[meanwagei   wi]
vi
:
7If b also increases by 5%, then an MPBE implies all wages increase by 5% and there
is no change in turnover.
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time t 0  0+ 6months 20 months new steady state
Hire Flows
gross hires 0.0360 0.0369 0.0369 0.0369 0.0370
hires1 0.0063 0.0066 0.0066 0.0066 0.0065
hires2 0.0135 0.0138 0.0138 0.0138 0.0138
hires3 0.0162 0.0164 0.0165 0.0165 0.0166
Quit Flows
gross quits 0.0317 0.0324 0.0324 0.0326 0.0328
quits1 0.0175 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180 0.0181
quits2 0.0117 0.0118 0.0119 0.0120 0.0121
quits3 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026
Table 4. Impulse Response Function: Gross Flows.
Across date t = 0; the 5% productivity shock generates an immediate
2.5% increase in gross hires. But increased hires by type 2 and 3 rms
triggers a correspondingly large increase in quit rates by workers employed
in type 1 and 2 rms. In this example, the 2.5% increase in gross hires is
almost matched by a 2.2% increase in gross quits. Such "churning" severely
crowds out the re-employment prospects of the unemployed and explains
why unemployment has such a long half-life. Across the entire adjustment
process, gross ows are almost perfectly correlated over time (both increase
slowly as unemployment falls).
Table 5 describes how wages change. It computes the average wage of
employees in each type i sector, where [meanwage1]0 is the mean wage of
type 1 employees in the initial steady state and [meanwage1]t is their mean
wage at date t > 0.
time t 0+ 6 months 20 months new steady state
meanwaget [meanwage]0
[meanwage]0
3.7% 3.8% 4.0% 4.3%
[meanwage1]t [meanwage1]0
[meanwage1]0
1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8%
meanwage2 [meanwage2]0
[meanwage2]0
3.6% 3.6% 3.7% 3.9%
meanwage3 [meanwage3]0
[meanwage3]0
5.3% 5.4% 5.5% 5.7%
Table 5. Impulse Response Function: Wage Dynamics.
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The rst row describes the total change in average wages across all em-
ployed workers. As b is xed, a permanent 5% increase in productivity leads
average wages to rise by less than 5%. More interestingly, there is a large
increase in wage inequality: average type 1 wages increase by only 1.8% while
average type 3 wages increase by more than 5%.
7 Conclusion.
The CM framework identies a rich, equilibrium model of job and labor
ows that seems ideal for both macro-policy applications and micro-empirical
analysis. In contrast to Menzio and Shi (2011) and Lise and Robin (2015),
dynamic monopsony generates ine¢ ciently high unemployment levels. It
thus identies genuine policy implications. In contrast to Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2013), it also incorporates rich industry dynamics as small
start-up companies enter the market over time, some older, existing rms exit
and employees keep searching on-the-job for preferred employment prospects.
Firm specic productivity shocks not only allow that rm growth rates may
decline with age but a skewed entry distribution allows that start-up rms
have relatively low survival rates relative to the market, yet have higher
average growth rates [e.g. Haltiwanger et al (2013)].
The CM framework does not exhibit an amplication mechanism: small
changes in productivity do not yield large changes in (net) rm hiring rates.
This is not necessarily an important failure of the model for it can easily ac-
comodate large (exogenous) job destruction shocks (by rm type). Of course
following Shimer (2005) it has typically been presumed that job destruc-
tion shocks cannot play an important role in the theory of unemployment.
Elsby et al (2009), however, document that job destruction shocks are neither
small nor acyclical. Furthermore Menzio and Shi (2011) show, with on-the-
job search, that large (endogenous) variations in job destruction rates not
only generate large variations in unemployment over the cycle, the resulting
vacancy dynamics are also data consistent.
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